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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court in this
case is founded on Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j).

The

Supreme Court assigned this case to the Court of Appeals, which
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
!•

Did appellant Intermountain Printing ("Intermountain")

satisfy its heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial court
clearly erred in the factual findings supporting its conclusion
that Intermountain was not constructively evicted from the
property leased from appellee Sheree Hewett ("Hewett") and,
therefore, was not justified in withholding rent?

II.

Did Intermountain satisfy its heavy burden of

demonstrating that the trial court clearly erred in the factual
findings supporting its conclusion that Intermountain's refusal
to pay rent was a breach of the Lease which was not excused
because Hewett substantially fulfilled her Lease obligations to
repair or justifiably delayed repairing specific problems?

III.

Did Intermountain satisfy its heavy burden of

demonstrating that the trial court clearly erred in the factual
findings supporting its conclusion that Hewett acted in a
commercially reasonable manner to mitigate damages after
Intermountain had abandoned the property?

2SGM0401.1
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
For purposes of assessing the issues on appeal the
determinations provision is Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),
which provides:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee Hewett commenced this action against D&S
Corporation, dba Intermountain Printing/Type Tech
("Intermountain") seeking damages for nonpayment of rent under a
five-year lease agreement dated January 21, 1991. A bench trial
was held on November 14 and 15 of 1993. Following the trial,
the court entered judgment in favor of Hewett ordering that
Intermountain pay the rent payments due under the lease.
Intermountain filed a notice of appeal on March 20, 1995, after
which the Utah Supreme Court assigned this case to the Court of
Appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Original Lease
On February 11, 1991, Intermountain's president Dave
Thomas ("Thomas") entered into a five-year lease with Hewett for
a commercial building ("the building") located at 3772
Washington Boulevard for $900 per month.

(Trial Transcript

(hereinafter "T."). at 241; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).
250\10401.1

_

According

to the pertinent portions of the Lease, maintenance for the
building was apportioned so that Hewett was responsible for the
roof, exterior walls, structural repair, exterior painting,
heating and air conditioning equipment, whereas Intermountain
accepted responsibility for interior walls, interior decorating,
light globes and tubes, glass breakage, trash removal and
janitor.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Attached as Exhibit A ) .
Prior to leasing the building to Intermountain, Hewett

had used her building for a hair salon.

(T. at 70). The

removal of the hair salon equipment resulted in holes where the
sinks had been and plugged off plumbing and wiring systems.

(T.

at 163). When, however, Gary Charlesworth ("Charlesworth"), the
realtor for Wardley Corporation who showed the property to
Thomas, pointed out these conditions to Thomas, he responded
that he had no problem accepting the building because the
exposed drains and telephone wires would be in Intermountain's
production room.

(T. at 188).

During most of the time that Intermountain occupied
the building, the company employed Rusty Hardy ("Hardy") who did
the maintenance work for Intermountain.

(T. at 327-38).

Hardy

reported that routinely he had to clean up dirt that blew under
the windows, particularly during storms.

(T. at 235-38).

Thomas, however, never reported any problem to Hewett relating
to dirt coming in under the windows or under the foundation.
(T. at 283).

250U0401.1
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Thomas did testify that about six times he had seen
water coming in the building from the sprinkling system that
Hewett had installed and that he reported the incoming water to
Hewett.

(T. at 277).

However, although Thomas stated that he

himself never cleaned up that water, Hardy never saw such water,
and Thomas could not explain why his maintenance personnel had
never seen any water in the building.

(T. at 235, 239 & 277).

In March 1993, Intermountain voluntarily vacated the
building for business reasons.

(T. at 242-43).

Condition of the Vacated Building
Immediately after vacating the building, Thomas
contacted Charlesworth, the same realtor who assisted him in
leasing the building, and engaged him to sublease the building
on his behalf.

(T. at 243).

Charlesworth first went into the

property about two weeks later. At that time he did not notice
water marks, but did notice dust, exposed wires and broken
lights.

(T. at 227-28).
Charlesworth's agent Sharon Hoel ("Hoel") also entered

the building after March of 1993 to show the premises to
prospective lessees in July, August, October and November of
1993.

(T. at 165). She described the building as having

exposed security system and telephone wires, broken light
fixtures, an extremely dirty bathroom, counter tops stained blue
and brown, chairs upside down, and cobwebs on the light
fixtures.

250\10401.1
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exterior of the building and was apparently concerned about the
activities of "kids" in that area.

(T. at 149).

After Hewett received a key to the building sometime
in the fall of 1993, she went into the building and was
horrified by the dirt, broken glass and stained counter tops.
(T. at 74-75 and 104).

She thought the building had been

vandalized (T. at 75), and did not consider it her
responsibility to clean up after Intermountain.
and 110).

(T. at 105-106

When Hewett's realtor Dana Hale ("Hale") first

entered the building with Hewett in October or November of 1993,
it was his immediate impression that "the previous tenant in
vacating the building had not gone through and cleaned the
property."

(T. at 18).

The overall appearance of the building

was that the floors were dirty, the counter tops were dirty,
there were broken light fixtures.

Id.

Intermountain's Initial Subleasing Attempts
On behalf of Intermountain, Hoel showed the building a
total of about six times, offering the building at a rental
price of $950.00 to $970.00, which exceeded the $900 per month
rental in Intermountain's lease with Hewett.

(T. at 156).

During the summer of 1993, Hoel had shown the building one
prospective sublessee who she described as going through the
building "inch by inch."

(T. at 132). After this woman

inspected the building a second time, she had Hoel prepare a
list of questions concerning who would take care of certain

2S0V10401.1
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repairs and/or modifications in the building that were of
concern to her.

(T. at 132 & 148-49).

[for your information]:

The list stated:

M

FYI

leaks roof and overhang, floor tiles,

dryer vent, paint, counter tops, cooling system unit full of
dirt, light fixtures over sink, replace light fixtures, dirt
inside, handicap bathroom, foundation cracked, floor drain,
window cracked, overhang rotting."
Attached as Exhibit B)

(Defendant's Exhibit 23,

(punctuation added).

When Hoel was unable to sublease the building to the
above-mentioned prospective sublessee, she took Charlesworth to
the building (T. at 192) and showed him the concerns reported in
the list.

(T. at 198). Hoel then faxed the list of the

prospective tenant's concerns to Thomas on August 31, 1993.
at

(T

245; Defendant's Exhibit 23, Attached as Exhibit B ) .
Intermountain's Demand for Repair
After receiving the fax from Hoel, Thomas sent a note

to Hewett listing the items from Hoel's fax and demanding that
Hewett repair all of the items on the note he sent to her.
at 249-50; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Attached as Exhibit B).

(T.
In a

follow up letter of September 14, 1993, Thomas related
difficulty leasing the building because of problems including
"the roof and overhang leak and the front window leak, therefore
the tiles had started to warp.

The building needs to be painted

inside and out and the cooling system does not work.

250MO4O1.1
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It is full

of sand, the foundation is cracked and a window is broken."
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, attached as Exhibit B ) .
Hewett responded to Thomas's correspondence by a
letters apprising Thomas that she did not intend to do any
repairs until the rent was brought current and further stating
"only then will I consider doing the necessary repairs."
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). On October 5, 1994 she also asked for
a key to the building so that she could "see what damage is done
to my building."
B).

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, attached as Exhibit

Thomas then received two letters from Timothy W. Blackburn,

as legal counsel for Hewett, requesting payment of overdue rent
plus accrued attorney's fees after which Hewett would repair the
items for which she was responsible under the Lease.
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8; Attached as Exhibit B ) .
Instead of referring to the lease to determine which
items listed in his note to Hewett were her responsibility,
Thomas insisted that he considered Hewett responsible for all
items listed.

(T. at 270-71).
Alleged Problems with the Building

One of the pivotal problems with the building
described to the trial court was a roof leak in the interior of
the building.

Hewett's counsel referred to the leak as a

"phantom leak," (T. at 325), because water from the alleged leak
appeared inside the building only on one occasion over the
course of a year and a half as a water spot about ten inches in

280M 0401.1
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diameter,

(T. at 170). It was defendant's position, however,

that the roof had entirely failed and had to be replaced.

(T.

at 318).
This water leak was not noticed by Charlesworth when
Intermountain first asked him to sublease the building.

Despite

entering the building several times, Charlesworth did not notice
any water problems in the building during the five months
between March and August of 1993.

(T. at 192). Charlesworth

only noticed any water problems in the building after Hoel
alerted him in August 1993.

(T. at 192). When Hoel first saw

the water on the floor, which she described as about threefourths cup of water, she stated that she thought she should mop
the water up but didn't.

(T. at 136). After the water

disappeared, she never wiped up the mineral deposit apparently
left in the area and never saw water there again.
Once Hewett regained access to her building in the
fall of 1993, she watched carefully for the leak in the roof
that had been reported to her, particularly after rain.
84, 93-94, 112-13).

(T. at

She adamantly testified that the roof did

not leak because after inspecting on repeated occasions, she saw
no evidence of a roof leak.

(T. at 112-113).

She took Dana

Hale ("Hale"), a real estate agent with twenty-three years of
experience, through the building with her to look specifically
for leaks and neither of them found any evidence of leaks.

(T.

at 15-16 & 19). Hale continued to go through the property after

250M 0401.1
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rainy weather until the spring of 1994 for the express purpose
of looking for a water leak after the rain.

(T. at 19 & 21 &

23).
After six months of looking for a leak, Hewett first
saw evidence of the alleged leak in March of 1994 when she
accompanied her attorney Timothy Blackburn through the building
after he had been shown the leak site by Hoel and Charlesworth.
(T. at 181, 184 & 211). She testified that if she had been
aware of an active leak she would offer to fix it because she
considered a small leak to be minor.

(T. at 117).

The mineral deposit allegedly left by the roof leak
was never cleaned up despite the fact that Intermountain claimed
to have had the building thoroughly cleaned several times. The
spot was eventually photographed in April 1994 by Hewett along
with certain stains on the counter and the roof where the leak
allegedly originated.

(T. at 91-96).

Defendants at no time

objected that these pictures were not an accurate representation
of the problems at issue.

Id.

The list faxed to Thomas also asked about water
leakage causing the exterior overhang of the building to sag and
about a crack in the exterior foundation.

Mr. Echard, counsel

for Intermountain, requested "that I'd like to have the court go
out and observe the building," (T. at 285-86).

Mr. Echard

stressed that he wanted the court to see "the significant

250U 0401.1
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extensive nature" of the water damage to the exterior overhang.
(T. at 287).
Mr. Blackburn to Mr. Echard's request by alerting the
court to his client's position that crack in the foundation did
not cause any problem and any leak that had developed in the
overhang was not material because it did not affect the
building.

(T. at 286-87).

Intermountain's witness Charlesworth

had also testified that a leaking overhang on the exterior of
the building does not affect the useability of the building.
(T. at 225). Hewett testified the foundation had Ma few chipped
cement and that's about it."

(T. at 78).

The trial court personally viewed this situation on
November 14, 1994.

(Affidavit of Judge Michael D. Lyon,

Attached as Exhibit C).
The list also noted that certain tiles were buckling
near the front door.
extent of the damage.

(T. at 198). The parties disputed the
Hale testified to observing Ma tile that

seemed to bulge a little bit and chances are it might have been
a direct result of the concrete rather than any type of damage."
(T. at 25).
Hewett did have a construction worker look at the
problem with the tile (T. at 76) and she spoke to a roofer (T.
at 119-120).

She cleaned out the cooling system which she

thought had been vandalized.

(T. at 77-78 and 109). She

considered the broken window to be a tenant responsibility.

250M0401.1
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(T.

at 78)• She remarked that glass over certain light fixtures was
entirely gone which she considered a tenant responsibility.

(T.

at 89).
When Thomas was asked whether he had been diligent in
his efforts to mitigate damages which accrued as a result of
failure to sublease, he answered that his agent had been
diligent on his behalf.

(T. at 266).

Thomas had described the

building as dilapidated (T. at 248), but neither he nor his
agent, however, testified to doing anything to repair the
problems on the list related to his Lease responsibilities to
maintain the building's interior.

He testified that he had the

building cleaned while it was vacant, but Hewett testified that
any such cleaning efforts left the building dirtier than before.
(T. at 90).
building.

Thomas never had a roofing expert look at the
(T. at 281).
Adequacy of Notice

During the trial, Hewett's attorney Timothy Blackburn
proffered that Hewett would testify that when discussing the
building's problems, Charlesworth constantly referred her to
Thomas while Thomas referred her to Charlesworth.

(T. at 289).

Timothy Blackburn also proffered that neither Thomas nor
Charlesworth ever told her of the leaks under the window through
which dirt came into the building nor did they tell her that the
building could be leased if only it had a new roof.
288).

250M 0401.1
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(T. at

Charlesworth actually had testified he had only one
conversation with Hewett when she called him in November of 1993
because she believed rent was owed to her.

(T. at 189-90 &

229). Charlesworth told Hewett then of problems with the
building but admitted never specifying what things were actually
wrong with the building.

(T. at 229).

to Dave Thomas about the problems.

He told Hewett to speak

Id.

He testified he never

told Hewett that if the roof were fixed he would be able to rent
the building.

(T. at 230).

Hewett testified that she requested that Intermountain
notify her when the leak reappeared so that she could have the
situation assessed.

(T. at 127). She testified "It's difficult

to repair a leak if there's no leak."

Id.

According to

Charlesworth, when a shingle roof of the type on the building
leaks, one cannot necessarily tell where the leak originates.
(T. at 208).
Intermountain's Inability to Release
Charlesworth testified that the average time to lease
a vacated commercial building is six to nine months.
232).

(T. at

The interior problems of the building were no problem for

the right kind of tenant.

(T. at 188 and 338).

However, after

more than a year Charlesworth's agency was unable to sublet on
Intermountain's behalf.
During that time, Intermountain had asked Charlesworth
to sublease at $970.00 to $950.00 which amount exceeded its

250M 0401.1
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lease rental of $900.00. On one occasion Charlesworth reduced
the rent to a prospective lessee named Kendall, offering to
lease the property at $680 per month.

(T. at 214).

Kendall

declined to sublease, however, because he decided against moving
from his present location.

(T. at 231).

Gary Charlesworth stated that several prospective
tenants did not lease the building because it appeared larger
than it was and its available space was inadequate for
prospective sublessee' needs.

(T. at 231).

The particular prospective sublessee who composed the
above-mentioned list had wanted to know if the landlord would
agree to putting in a handicapped accessible bathroom to
accommodate her elderly customers. Hoel, however, found out
that such modification was not required by the county, and the
woman declined subleasing the building at least in part for that
reason.

(T. at 164-65).
Efforts to Mitigate
When Intermountain returned its key to Hewett and

refused to pay further rent, she contracted to release the
property through Hale.

He stated that here were two main

factors which influenced the value of a property for releasing.
(T. at 27).
Id.

The first was the user, the second being the time.

In determining a reasonable value for releasing the

property, Hale also noted the significance of the lease being in

250\10401.1
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default and the need to satisfy the underlying obligation.

(T.

at 28).
Hale showed the property to the proprietor of Soup
Haven, small business entrepreneurs, mortgage companies, a hair
salon and ultimately ended up renting the property as a floral
shop.

(T. at 22-23).

The new tenant James Heine ("Heine")

acquired the building around the first of September of 1994 in
order to relocate his floral business.

(T. at 53).

He had to

remodel the building to meet his needs by adding partition
walls, adding a walk-in cooler, putting in new windows,
carpeting and painting.

(T. at 54). Heine did not ask for or

do structural repairs to the building.

(T. at 55).

In negotiating the rent, James Heine stated that he
was aware that the building had been empty for a year and a half
and offered less because he knew that the building had been
sitting empty for a period of time.

(T. at 67). Under such

circumstances, Hale ascertained that a lease of $600 per month
was a reasonable value for the particular property at the
particular time.

(T. at 28-29).

Heine signed the lease for the

building on August 31, 1994 after having examined the property
approximately five times.

(T. at 60). In these inspections of

the property, he had never gone around and looked at the
foundation to see if there were any cracks or to see if the
cracks had been patched. (T. at 62). Although it had rained and
snowed quite a bit during the time that Heine inspected and

250M0401.1
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occupied the building, he never noticed leaks in the roof•

(T.

at 55).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the trial court should be upheld on
appeal because Intermountain failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating that the findings of fact upon which this decision
was based were clearly erroneous.

The conclusions of the trial

court merit deference on appeal because they are highly fact
sensitive.

Furthermore, Intermountain's failure to marshall the

evidence forecloses its right to base any appeal on disagreement
with the trial court's findings of fact.
The trial court correctly determined that
Intermountain did not meet its constructive eviction defense to
nonpayment of rent because Intermountain did not demonstrate
that the leased building was unsuitable for the purposes
intended in the lease, the notice given to Hewett to repair was
inadequate, and her efforts to repair satisfied her duties under
the Lease.
Based upon essentially the same facts, the trial court
correctly concluded that Intermountain breached the lease by
nonpayment of rent and that its breach was not excused by any
action or omission on the part of Hewett.

The trial court also

found that Hewett's efforts to release the property satisfied
her burden to mitigate damages and, therefore, awarded her
breach of lease damages.

Because Intermountain did not satisfy

250M 0401.1
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its heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial court's
decision lacked evidentiary support, its appeal should be
dismissed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE UPHELD
BECAUSE INTERMOUNTAIN FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT CLEAR ERROR IS THE FINDINGS SUPPORTING THE DECISION.
In the case before this court on appeal Intermountain
failed to demonstrate clear error in the trial court's findings
that Hewett as landlord should be awarded damages from her
tenant Intermountain because Intermountain unjustifiably
withheld rent.

Intermountain sought to defend the suit for non-

payment of rent under a written lease by claiming constructive
eviction, breach of contract, and failure to mitigate.

On

appeal Intermountain challenges the trial court's decisions in
favor of Hewett on all three issues.
In reviewing the trial court's decision, this court
should recognize that in order to give the trial judge adequate
freedom to apply the legal principle to the facts, the Utah
Supreme Court recently rejected the idea that de novo review of
certain legal questions is appropriate where the legal question
is highly fact-dependent.
(Utah 1994).

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38

The amount of discretion or the size of the

"pasture"1 expands where the facts applied to the legal rule or
1

The Supreme Court used the metaphor of a pasture in
describing the degrees of discretion accorded a trial court's
application of legal propositions to facts. Pena, 869 P.2d at
250\10401.1
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standard are varying or complex and where the trial judge has
observed "facts," such as witness demeanor, that cannot be
adequately reflected in the record.

Id. at 938-39.

In this case, deference rather than de novo review is
particularly appropriate as the dispute on all three issues is
highly fact sensitive.

In assessing the disputed facts, the

trial court not only observed the witnesses's demeanor but also
reviewed photographs of the building's disputed features taken
by Hewett, to which Intermountain entered no objection.
86-95).

(T. at

Furthermore, at the suggestion of Intermountain's

counsel (T. at 285-288), the court actually traveled to the site
of the property in question and personally viewed its exterior.
See Affidavit of Judge Michael Lyon, Attached as Exhibit C.
Therefore, the record brought up on review cannot recreate the
image to which the trial court was privy when evaluating
conflicting testimony and assessing the weight of the evidence.

A. Intermountain's failure to marshal the
evidence requires the appellate court to
assume that the trial court's findings are
correct•
Specifically in the context of a challenge to a
conclusion that no constructive eviction occurred, the Utah
Supreme Court declared, "To mount a successful challenge to the
correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant

937-38.
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must first marshal all of the evidence supporting the finding
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the findings even in viewing it in the light most
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha. 116

favorable to the court below."

P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); see also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

This requirement of marshaling the

evidence is consistent with the broad deference owed to a finder
of fact at trial.

State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App.

1990).
An appellant cannot meet its burden on appeal by
simply by stating facts contrary to the trial court's findings.
Marshalling requires the appellant first to gather supporting
evidence and then demonstrate that the trial court's findings on
a particular point lack adequate support in the record "under
the clearly erroneous standard."

Reid, 776 P.2d at 901.

"If the appellant fails to so marshal the evidence,
the appellate court need not consider the challenge to its
sufficiency."

Id. at 738-39.

Furthermore, the reviewing court

will assume that the trial court's findings are correct.

Alta

Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993);
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992) (where
appellant failed to marshall evidence, appellate court assumed
record supported findings of the trial court).
Because Intermountain has not even attempted to carry
the "heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence supporting the
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trial court's detailed findings, the merits of Intermountain's
contentions need not be addressed or considered on appeal,
Intermountain's has forfeited the right to challenge the trial
court's legal conclusions on the grounds of disagreement with
findings of fact because such findings are assumed correct for
purposes of appeal.
B. Intermountain's failure to marshal1 the
evidence contributed to its
misrepresentation of the trial court's
decision making process.
One of the results of an appellant's failure to
marshall evidence is that the appellant avoids the
responsibility to assess accurately the evidence contrary to its
position and thereby reflect on how the trial court might have
reached its decision.

In this case, Intermountain's appeal

focuses so exclusively on the contrary evidence supporting its
appeal that Intermountain actually misconstrued the trial
court's interchange with Hewett's counsel Timothy Blackburn
during the responsive portion of plaintiff's closing argument.

Intermountain argued in its brief:

"Since the tixai

court judge did not have a transcript of the comments he had
made during the trial, the Judge may have forgotten his
conclusions and concerns which had been stated at the time of
the trial."

Appellant's Brief at 21 (emphasis added) (citing T.

at 325-28, 332-36).

However, a careful review of the pages that

Intermountain cited in the record demonstrates that the alleged
250M 0401.1
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"conclusions" were actually questions and comments made by the
trial court to alleviate specific concerns prior to arriving at
meaningful conclusions.
The court asked challenging questions to force Mr.
Blackburn to develop his arguments.

(T. at 325). The court

also developed several hypothetical, the first beginning with
the statement "But let's assume

,"

(T. at 326-27), a second

beginning "Let's assume that I agreed with you. . . that the
premises always remained suitable for the purpose for which this
they were rented and, therefore, there was no constructive
eviction."

(T. at 332).
In trying to understand the pivotal question of

whether Hewett was justified in delaying the repair or
replacement the roof, the court acknowledged, "I think probably
in hindsight, based on the evidence, you [counsel for Hewett]
may be correct" and then probed for the explanation by which she
prospectively justified her actions.

(T. at 328-29).

After

hearing Mr. Blackburn's explanation for Hewett's electing not to
have a roofer physically examine the roof, the court stated,
"okay.

And if I —

if I agreed with that . . . then we get to

the next step of . . . "

(T. at 334). The court described

testimony adverse to Hewett's position and then asked, "How
would you answer that?"

After listening to Mr. Blackburn's

explanation, the court stated, "Okay.
little further."

250M 0401.1
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But let me explore that a

Mischaracterizing such comments and hypothetical
questions as "conclusions" and then suggesting that by virtue of
the delay between the trial and the decision, "the Judge may
have forgotten his conclusions and concerns which had been
stated at the time of the trial" ignores the prerogative of the
trial court to select whatever means it considers most effective
for clarifying issues of concern.

Unless the trial court

specifically states that it is ruling from the bench, legal
counsel should not construe, rely on, or assert that the trial
court's analytical questions and probative comments constitute
"conclusions."

C. The trial court's conclusions were based
upon its assessment of witness credibility
and specific findings of fact to which
Utah's appellate courts accord substantial
deference.
Intermountain's appeal has failed to demonstrate clear
error in the findings of fact upon which the trial court based
its conclusions.

On appeal of a judgment from a bench trial,

the appellate courts in Utah defer to the trial court's factual
assessment and review its findings under the "clearly erroneous"
standard.

Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blackner Appliance &

Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88, 83 (Utah App. 1988); Utah R.Civ.P.
52(a).

Findings of fact are only clearly erroneous if it can be

shown that they are "against the clear weight of the evidence,
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm

250YI0401.1
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conviction that a mistake has been made."

Copper State v.

Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
It is clear that it is not the function of an
appellate court to determine the credibility of witnesses.
State v. Bagleyr 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984); Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a).

"Deciding whether a witness is

believable and determining what weight to assign a witness's
testimony are matters within the discretion of the finder of
facts."

Lemmon v. Coatesr 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987).

II.
INTERMOUNTAIN'S CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
CONCLUSION THAT NO CONSTRUCTION EVICTION OCCURRED MUST FAIL
BECAUSE INTERMOUNTAIN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE CLEAR ERROR IN THE
UNDERLYING FACTUAL FINDINGS.
The factual findings of the trial court indicate that
it concluded Hewett did not constructively evict Intermountain
because Intermountain did not meet the elements of that defense
to nonpayment of rent.

Constructive eviction is defined in Utah

law as occurring "'when a tenant's right of possession and
enjoyment of the leased premises is interfered with by the
landlord. . . as to render the premises, or a part thereof,
unsuitable for the purposes intended.'"
Enters., 889 P.2d 476,

Barton v. M.P.B.

477 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Brugger

v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982)).

Constructive

eviction is premised on the idea that the landlord's actions or
inaction "basically drove the tenant out" by substantially, and
injuriously interfering with "the tenant's beneficial use and
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enjoyment of the premises."

Id. (discussing Kenyon v.

Reagan,826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah App. 1992).
For purposes of a constructive eviction defense, this
case is unusual because Intermountain does not claim that any
action or inaction of Hewett caused the building to become
unsuitable for its use or enjoyment.

Instead, Intermountain

argues that Hewett's failure to repair the building, after
Intermountain voluntarily vacated, interfered with its ability
to sublet to a third party.

The trial court, however, found the

"premises were very habitable."

(Findings of Fact I 40). This

finding merits deference on appeal because whether certain
premises were suitable for the purposes intended is a factual
finding.

Reid, 776 P.2d at 899) (describing assessment of

whether claimed annoyances rendered premises unsuitable for
their intended uses as fact issue).
After failing to sublease the property after more
than a year, Thomas abandoned the property and refused to pay
further rent claiming that its inability to sublet resulted from
Hewett's failure to repair.

The failure to make repairs may

constitute constructive eviction.

Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648.

However, for purposes of a claim of constructive eviction, the
repairs demanded by the lessee must relate to that tenant's own
right of possession and enjoyment of leased premises and the
failure to repair must be so substantial as "to render the
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premises or a part thereof, unsuitable for the purposes
intended.M

Id,
Intermountain's first problem with its defense is that

it demanded that Hewett repair the property to a degree
exceeding that for which Intermountain had contracted.
Intermountain had leased Hewett's former beauty salon for use as
a printing shop.

Mr. Charlesworth, the realtor who showed the

property to Thomas testified that when he pointed out the
unsightly features that remained after the beauty salon
equipment was removed to Thomas, Thomas said that he had no
problem accepting the property in that condition because during
Intermountain's tenancy the problem features would be located in
the production room.

(T. at 188).

In its appeal, however, Intermountain claimed that it
could not sublease partly because Hewettfs removal of beauty
salon equipment prior to its occupancy left the building in
disrepair.

Thomas, however, having voluntarily contracted to

pay Hewett $900.00 per month for the building "as isM had no
right to demand later that she remodel the premises to be more
attractive so that Thomas could sublease it at a profit of
between $50.00 and $70.00 per month.
Intermountain also complained that the property could
not be sublet because dirt seeping in under the windows made it
impossible for Intermountain to keep the property clean.
Intermountain, however, was fully aware of the dirt seepage

29CA10401.1
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problem throughout the entire year that it conducted business in
the property and never complained.

(T. at 235-37). Passive

acceptance of the dirt seepage problem reasonably allowed the
trial court to infer that seepage did not materially impact
Intermountain's ability to carry out responsibility to maintain
the interior premises.
A. Thomas' testimony demonstrated both his
ignorance of the scope of Hewett's
responsibilities to repair and his
misunderstanding of the listed items.
Intermountain's second problem with a constructive
eviction defense based on breach of the duty to repair is that
Intermountain demanded repairs desired by a third party without
regard to whether such repairs exceeded the scope of the duty to
repair created by the Lease. One prospective lessee had asked
Intermountain's realtor to compose a list of items in order to
find out who would be responsible for their maintenance.
Testimony at trial indicated that Intermountain treated this
list as the authoritative word on problems with the property
which Hewett should repair.
This list was faxed to Thomas on August 31, 1993, and
then essentially copied by Thomas in a note to Hewett stating,
Sheree / had some people interested in the building but would
not because of the following reasons.
1) Roof leaks and overhang leaks
2) Floortilesup front water damage
3) Dryer vents
4) Painting
2S0S10401 1
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5) Cooling system unit full of dirt
6) Foundation cracked
7) Windows cracked
Please see to it that these items are fixed immediately.
Thanks Dave
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).
During the trial Hewett argued that she was not
responsible for all of the items on the list, (T. at 108-110)
and that she never, in any correspondence, promised to do more
than make repairs that were her responsibility under the Lease,
The lease delegated to Hewett maintenance responsibilities that
included the roof, exterior walls, structural repair, exterior
painting, heating and air conditioning equipment, and electrical
equipment but delegated to Intermountain all responsibility for
interior walls and decorating, light globes and tubes, glass
breakage, and trash removal.

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1,

Attached as Exhibit A ) .
However, regardless of this division of
responsibility, when asked which items on the list Thomas
thought were Hewett's responsibilities, he persisted in arguing
"I think that she [Hewett] has responsibility for every one of
them."

(T. at 270-75).

Thomas' misperception about his own

lease responsibility was unfortunately was compounded by a
misunderstanding of the reasons behind the inclusion of specific
items on the list originally faxed to him.
Testimony by Thomas attempting to explain the list
item
250M0401.1
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Dryer ventsu typifies this problem.
_ _

Thomas admitted that the

Lease did not say that Hewett was responsible for dryer vents.
(T. at 271). When asked to describe what the dryer vents were,
Thomas responded, "The dryer vents are where the tenants had —
the former tenants had I guess their hair —

It don't know that

much about beauty salons, but I guess its where they had their
dryer vents for getting their hair done."

Id.

When asked to

explain Hewett's responsibility for the dryer vents, Thomas
answered "As far as I know, she was just supposed to cover them
up."

Id.
By contrast to Thomas' perception, Sharon Hoel, the

real estate agent who originally wrote the list, explained the
reference in the notation "Dryervent" as follows:
A. There was a dryer vent that looked like
they had done laundry or something. She
[the prospective lesser] wanted to put one
there. She wanted to know if there was a
problem with re-putting one there.
Q. Just putting it in another in [sic] the
hole that's already there?
A.

Right.

(T. at 148).
Similarly, when Thomas was asked to explain what he
referred to when he included "Paint" on his list.

Thomas stated

that he referred to painting the outside of the building (T. at
272), although he admitted that he did not clarify that in the
list and although the letter he sent Hewett on September 14,
1994 reported, "The building needs to be painted inside and
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out,"

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Attached as Exhibit B).

Thomas

then testified that the reason he wanted Hewett to paint the
outside of the building because "That's what I was told by
Sharon."

(T. at 272).
Again by contrast, Sharon Hoel testified that she

referred to interior painting in the list she faxed to Thomas.
(T. at 148-49).

According to the Lease, interior paint would be

the responsibility of the tenant Intermountain.

See Lease

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Attached as Exhibit A ) .

"*A

constructive eviction cannot be predicated on a condition
arising from a want of repairs which it is the duty of the
tenant to make.'"

Mariani Air Prods. Corp. v. Gill's Tire Mkt.,

508 P.2d 808, 810 n.3 (Utah 1973) (quoting 49 Am. Jur. 2d
Landlord and Tenant, § 315, P. 333).
Thus, the demanded repairs had no relevance to use of
the property as intended by original Lease.

Furthermore, the

list of items that Thomas wanted Hewett to fix included
responsibilities delegated to Intermountain and other items
which Thomas misunderstood entirely.
B. Intermountain failed to demonstrate that
the clear weight of the evidence proved that
Hewett had received adequate notice of the
repairs that were her responsibility.
Intermountain's problem during the trial and on appeal
is that it evidently confused complaining with notice.

Findings

of the trial court indicate that the notice given to Hewett of
demanded repairs was confused, inadequate, and nonspecific.
250M0401.1
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For

constructive eviction to have occurred, however, the landlord
must have received adequate notice of the defect interfering
with the lessee's possession and enjoyment of the property and
then failed to remedy those defects.

See Kenyon. 826 P.2d at

142.
Lack of effective communication between the parties
exacerbated their difficulties.

When Hewett sought information

about Intermountain's complaints, Thomas referred her to
Charlesworth while Charlesworth referred her to Thomas.
289).

(T. at

Thomas testified that he wanted Hewett to call him and

talk to him about the items he had listed in the note he gave to
Hewett.

(T. at 270). However, he admitted that the list he

gave Hewett never said that he had wanted her to call.
Charlesworth, Thomas' real estate agent, testified he only had
one conversation with Hewett and that he told her there were
problems with the building, but did not specifically tell her
what was wrong.

(T. at 229).

The trial court found that Hewett reasonably responded
to the repairs that were hers to make and that she reasonably
asked to be advised when the roof leaked so that the leak could
be identified, analyzed and inexpensively repaired.

Findings of

Fact II 26 & 27. The trial court found it unreasonable to ask
Hewett to replace the entire roof to repair a phantom leak.
Id. at I 28.

These findings are particularly appropriate in

light of Intermountain's witness's testimony that one cannot
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necessarily tell where a shingle roof/ like that on the
building, is leaking because water can enter from one point and
exit some other place.

(T. at 208).

Only because the roof

never leaked again, Intermountain's personnel and realtors never
gave the requested notice to Hewett.
Because reasonable notice of an active leak was never
given, it cannot be said that a reasonable time for repairing
that problem had actually passed,
therefore did not occur.

constructive eviction

See Brugge£# 645 P.2d at 648

(maintenance problems remedied within reasonable time do not
constitute constructive eviction).
C. Intermountain failed to demonstrate
clear error in the trial court's finding
that prospective tenants decided not to
sublease for reasons outside Hewett's
control•
The issue of causation in assessing Intermountain's
failure to sublease the property becomes complicated by the fact
that subleasing is an independent decision by third parties
entirely outside the control of either party to the original
Lease.

The trial court found that prospective sublessees

decided not to sublease for various reasons independent of the
condition of the property.

(Findings of Fact II 16-22).

Charlesworth testified that the property deceived certain people
because it appeared larger from the outside than it actually
was.

Ironically, the prospective lessee who originally drafted

the infamous list actually had stated a separate concern which
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may have been pivotal to her decision not to sublease:

The

building lacked a handicapped bathroom to service her many
handicapped clients.
D. Intermountain cannot avoid the
deficiencies in its appeal by claiming that
the cumulative effect of unrepaired problems
constituted constructive eviction.
In Thirteenth and Washington Street Corp. v. Neslen,
254 P.2d 847 (Utah 1953), the Supreme Court of Utah determined
that the cumulative effect of unresolved adverse conditions
could become sufficient to establish a constructive eviction.
However, that court stated:

"This case was tried to the court

and it was peculiarly his prerogative to determine whether the
difficulties were sufficient to constitute a constructive
eviction of the tenant.

He could consider among other things

the nature and purpose for which the premises were used."

Id.

at 852. Furthermore, that court stated that in surveying
evidence to determine whether a trial court was justified in its
holding as to whether a constructive eviction occurred, an
appellate court reviews the holding "and every inference fairly
arising therefrom in the light most favorable to [the party
that] prevailed below."

Id. at 851.

Thus, it is particularly within the province of the
trial court to judge the cumulative effect of Intermountain's
complaints that Hewett failed to repair.

In fact, despite

Intermountain's attempts to analogize its facts to those in
Thirteenth Street, its facts are readily distinguishable.
2S0M0401.1
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In

the cited case, the court found that a cluttered and confusing
entry way, unsatisfactory restroom facilities, lack of heat and
unlighted stairway substantially interfered with the operation
of an office for attorneys who had to provide adequate access to
their clients.

The trial court in this case, however, found the

building habitable, thereby indicating that minor leaks and dirt
seepage and previously accepted unsightly features did not
substantially interfere with the operation of a printing
business or a comparable sublease.
For all of the above reasons, this reviewing court
should uphold the decision of the trial court determining that
Intermountain was not constructively evicted and therefore not
excused from paying the rent required by the Lease.
III. INTERMOUNTAIN FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE CLEAR ERROR IN THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT HEWETT DID NOT MATERIALLY BREACH THE
COVENANT TO REPAIR BUT THAT INTERMOUNTAIN BREACHED ITS DUTY TO
PAY RENT.
As noted by Intermountain, a lease agreement
establishes a relationship between a landlord and tenant that is
so substantially similar to a commercial transaction that legal
principles of contract law can be appropriately applied to
leases.

Reid, 776 P.2d at 902 n.3. However, Intermountain

failed to demonstrate clear error in the trial court's
application of the contract principles to the findings of fact
brought up on appeal.
A. The standard for reviewing the trial
court's findings as to breach of contract is
"clearly erroneous."
260MO4O1.1
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The essential question in this case is whether
Hewett's refusal to complete the repairs requested by
Intermountain constituted a substantial breach of the lease so
as to materially impair Intermountain's ability to perform and
to thereby justify its abandonment of the Lease.

"Whether a

party has materially breached a lease is generally a question of
fact of the fact finder."

Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v.

Smith's Food, 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App. 1994).

"The nature

and inherent importance of the respective covenant breached must
be the decisive factor in our determination whether
justification existed or not."

Larsen v. Knight, 233 P.2d 365,

376 (Utah 1951) (Wolfe, J. dissenting).
B. Intermountain failed to demonstrate that
the trial court's findings as to contract
breach were clearly erroneous.
The trial court essentially found that Hewett did not
materially breach her Lease with Intermountain.2

A material

breach is a failure of performance that "xdefeats the very
object of the contract' or %[is] of such prime importance that
the contract would not have been made if default in that
particular had been contemplated.'"

Polyglycoat Corp. v.

Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979).
2

Although the court did

"Where findings as to probative facts are made which
must necessarily follow the existence of a required ultimate
fact, the failure to expressly formulate a finding as to the
ultimate fact is not prejudicial error." Thirteenth Streetf 254
P.2d at 851.
250U04011
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not make a specific finding stating that any breach by Hewett
was not material, its findings were sufficiently detailed to
demonstrate such reasoning.

Id. at 899.

The trial court found that the leak that Intermountain
complained about was not obvious (Finding of Fact f 14), leaking
was not sufficient to prevent releasing, id. at I 20, the
building was habitable, id. at I 40, and that Intermountain used
the water problem as leverage to avoid the lease, id. at I 29.
The court further found that Hewett reasonably responded to her
duty to repair and that she was justified in delaying repair of
the roof because the leak was never shown to her.

Id. at I 30.

On the other hand, the trial court found that
Intermountain was late in paying rent, its refusal to pay rent
was unreasonable and nonpayment constituted a breach of the
Lease.

Id. at I 23, 38 & 41. The court found that

Intermountain was obligated to pay rent and sue for damages.
Id. at I 39.
As noted earlier in this brief, Intermountain's
failure to marshall evidence supporting these findings
forecloses its right to claim on appeal that the findings are
erroneous.

The facts that support the trial court's contract

analysis and its conclusion that Hewett should be awarded
damages for breach of lease are set forth in both the Fact
Section and the constructive eviction portion of the Argument in
this brief and therefore are not repeated here.

250M 0401.1
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These facts

amply demonstrate that Hewett's response to Intermountain's
demands for repair did not constitute a material breach of the
Lease.

Intermountain's failure to perform under the lease

therefore was not excused.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT HEWETT HAD
ADEQUATELY MITIGATED THE DAMAGES OWED BY INTERMOUNTAIN WHEN SHE
SUBLET THE PROPERTY.
The trial court found that Hewett mitigated her
damages.

Finding of Fact I 37.

"'The doctrine of avoidable

consequences, also referred to as mitigation of damages,
generally operates to prevent one against whom a wrong has been
committed from recovering any item of damage arising from the
wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or minimized by
reasonable means.'"

John Call Eng. Inc. v. Manti City Corp.,

795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Angelo's v. First
Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983)).
In modern commercial landlord-tenant transactions, "a
landlord who seeks to hold a breaching tenant liable for unpaid
rents has an obligation to take commercially reasonable steps to
mitigate its losses, which ordinarily means that the landlord
must seek to relet the premises."

Reid, 776 P.2d at 906.

Although a landlord must take positive steps to relet premises,
his or her efforts to mitigate are judged by a standard of
objective commercial reasonableness.

Id.

"[T]he objective

commercial reasonableness of mitigation efforts is a fact
question that depends heavily on the particularities of the
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property and the relevant market at the pertinent point in time.
Id. at 907.
The trial court in this case found that there were
specific circumstances that impacted Hewett's mitigation
efforts.

The property had stood vacant and the tenant who

eventually released it used extended vacancy in negotiating for
lower rent.

Findings of Fact I 34. The court also found that

Hewett became desperate to lease the property because she had
not received rent payments for ten months while she continued
paying mortgage payments.

Id. at I 35.

These particularities

of the property have relevance to Hewett's duty to mitigate.
As Intermountain pointed out in its brief, the Reid
court stated that it was not uncommon for a landlord to incur
expenses to remodel commercial property for a new tenant.
Appellant's Brief at 33. However, in the Reid decision,
remodeling was not discussed as part of the duty to
affirmatively act to mitigate damage, but rather in stating that
the cost of remodeling to accommodate a new tenant should Mbe
added to the amount recoverable from the breaching tenant.M
Reid, 776 P.2d at 907. Thus, Intermountain's complaint that
Hewett discounted the rent in her release during the remainder
of Intermountain's lease is without merit.

Whether by discount

to the new lessee or by damage assessment against the breaching
lessee, the landlord has a right to recover remodeling costs.

2SOM04011

-36-

Specifically Intermountain complained that Hewett's
failure to repair the leaking roof demonstrated that she failed
to mitigate.

Intermountain's brief compared the evidence of the

leak to tracks of an animal which it would defy logic to state
had mysteriously disappeared.

Appellant's Brief at 34. The

trial court, however, found that it was reasonable for Hewett to
delay repair until Intermountain alerted her to a reappearance
of the leak in the interior of the building.

The fact that

Intermountain was never able to demonstrate that the leak
reappeared may defy logic, but it does not prove that Hewett did
not mitigate her damages.

This court should therefore affirm

the damages awarded Hewett by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
This appellate court should affirm the decision of the
trial court because Intermountain has failed to satisfy its
burden of demonstrating that the conclusions of the trial court
were founded on clearly erroneous factual findings.
Intermountain claimed that the trial court erred in finding that
it had not been constructively evicted, that Intermountain, not
Hewett breached the Lease, and that Hewett adequately mitigated
her damages.

Intermountain failed to marshall the evidence

supporting the trial court's decision on these issues, and in
fact was unable to demonstrate that these conclusions were based
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upon findings of fact that lacked evidentiary support in the
record.
DATED this

day of August, 1995.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By

Timothy W. Blackburn
Sandra L. Crosland
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
2404 Washington Boulevard,
Suite 900
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-5783
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing
postage prepaid, this

Brief of Appellee to be mailed,

/^^^day of August, 1995, to the

following:
Robert A, Echard
Robert A. Echard & Associates
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84401
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Sheree Hewett
748 Maple Street
Ogden, Utah 84403
September 14, 1993
Dear Sheree,
I am having trouble leasing the building because of some problems with it that
need your immediate attention.
The roof and overhang leak and the front windows leak, therefore the tiles have
started to warp. The building needs to be painted inside and out and the cooling
system does not work. It is full of sand, the foundation is cracked and a window is
broken.
I have had many people inquire about the building but all have said that it is in too
bad of shape.
I will not continue to pay rent if these items are not fixed. Call me if you have any
questions.
Thank you,

Dave C. Thomas
President

Iatermouotaia Priattng / TvpeTecB
Document Svstemt Corporation
Corporate Offices: 825 25th Street
Phone 801-394-4162

Ogden. Utih 84401

Fax 801-393-0640

South Ogden: 3772 Washington Boulevard
Phone 801-399-0067

Ogden. Utah 84405

Fax 801-399-0068
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W BLACKBURN

OGOEN OFFICE

PLEASE REPLY TO
OGOEN O F F I C E

SUITE 9 0 0
2*0<* WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
O G O E N . UTAH e * * O t
(801) 3 9 4 - 5 7 8 3

November 5,

1993

Mr. Dave C. Thomas
Document S y s t e m s C o r p o r a t i o n
825 2 5 t h S t r e e t
Ogden, UT 8 4 4 0 1
Dear Mr.

Thomas:

I represent Sheree Hewett. D&S Corp- doing business as
intermountain Printing/Type Tech, is in default of the lease
dated June 28, 1991, whereby it leased the property at 3772
Washington Boulevard.
D&S Corp. has failed to make the September, October and November
payments. The amount due for rent is $2, 700. 00.
Because you are in default, you owe my client' s attorney fees
which are $120. 00.
The lease provides that you pay one-half of the snow removal. My
client has paid the total fee and is willing to waive your onehalf if you pay the delinquency within ten (10) days.
I have reviewed your letters sent to my client. Section 57-22-5
Utah Code Annot. does not allow you to withhold rent if the items
you requested are not resolved.
My client will immediately repair the items for which she has
responsibility under the lease upon your payment of the rent.
The lease spells out specifically each parties responsibility to
maintain an item.
Any damage that is due to tenant1 s neglect is the responsibility
of the tenant to repair.
Request is made that you allow my client access to the premises
o that she may inspect the premises to determine what repairs
n
eed to be completed.

s

9

07\4983.

.

e c
°r r 5-

ssr

l e 2

*

4. «tthin the time s

. not "°»** rSere^Vomey tees.
the
tent
xs
not ^
f or ^
£
006ts.
L intends t o » f e e 6 ana °ou
•emoval fees, ^ t e
Sincerely.

! f / f l ^ h e r e e Hevett
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November 30, 1993

Mr. Dave C. Thomas
Document Systems Corporation
825 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Dear Mr. Thomas:
I represent Sheree Hewett. D & S Corporation, doing business as
Intermountain Printing/Type Tech, is in default of the lease
dated June 28, 1991, whereby it leased the property at 3772
Washington Boulevard. D & S Corporation has failed to make the
November payment. The amount due is $900. 00.
The lease provides
for attorney' s fees and attorney fees now have accrued to
$180. 00.
You failed to pay one half of the snow removal payments when you
paid the September and October rent. My client is still willing
to waive one half the snow removal if you pay the delinquent
November rent plus my client1 s attorney fees within ten days from
the date of this letter.
My client will immediately repair the items for which she has
responsibility under the lease upon your payment of the rent.
The lease spells out specifically each party' s responsibility to
maintain an item. Any damage that is due to your neglect is your
responsibility to repair.
Sincerely#

Timothy W. Blackburn
TWB/dh
cc:
Sheree Hewett
907X1752.
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March 28, 1994

Mr. Robert A. Echard
^ f S a s h t n g t o n Boulevard S u i t e 200
Ogden, UT 84401
Dear Bob:
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Mr. Dave C. Thomas
March 28, 1994
Page 2
leaks, my client will fix it. As soon as any leak appears, notify
my client and she will have someone fix it. It is difficult to
repair a leak when there is no leak.
In my opinion, the leaks are certainly not material and the court
will not terminate the lease based upon old evidence of two small
leaks.
In addition, your client did not bring the payments current because
he did not pay the attorney fees demanded.
These offers to settle expires March 31, 1994, at 5:00 p.m.
Sincerely,

Timothy V. Blackburn
TWB/dh
cc: Sheree Hewett
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March 22, 1994

Mr. Timothy Blackburn
Suite 900
2404 Washington Blvd
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Documents Systems Corporation Lease
3773 Washington Blvd, Ogden, Utah 84403

Dear Tim:
As you probably know I represent Dave Thomas. He has
contacted me recently concerning a lease he has with your client,
Sheree Hewett. My client leased property from yours in 1991. In
approximately September, 1993 my client complained to yours about
the fact that the building was in a poor state of repair, and
need to be brought to a good condition of repair so that he could
re-lease the property. When your client did not respond, he
withheld the rent payments.
In a letter from you dated November 5, 1993 you stated
•.. "my client will immediately repair the items for which she has
responsibility under the lease upon your payment of the rent.
The lease spells out specifically each parties responsibility to
maintain an item."
My client brought the payments current, however, your client
failed to repair the property, as required by the lease and as
agreed to in your November 5, 1993 letter.
I am hereby notifying you that my client considers that
failure a breach of the lease terms, and consequently no longer
feels bound by the terms of the lease. He has not been paying
lease payments since January, 1994 and will not pay any future
!aase payments on this property.

qi-oZO

page Two
March 22, 1994
I am sure the Court will have not difficulty in
understanding that the property is not of any value t,
as long as the lessor refuses to honor the lease teriu
provide a building that is capable of being re-lease,
client. My client has attempted to re-lease the prop
reduce the amount of the lease payments. However, nc
been willing to consider the property because the coi.
in.
Sincerely,
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES

Robert A. Echard
Attorney at Law
RAE/LER
cc:

Dave Thomas
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

]

SHEREE HEWETT,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

]1
1
I

vs.
D&S CORPORATION dba
INTERMOUNTAIN PRINTING/
TYPE TECH,

AFFIDAVIT OF THE HONORABLE
MICHAEL D. LYON, DISTRICT
COURT JUDGE

i

No.

950347-CA

1

Priority - 15

Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:

COUNTY OF WEBER

SS.

)

MICHAEL D. LYON, having been duly sworn, deposes and
states:
1.

I presently serve as a district judge for the

Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of Utah.
2.

In my capacity as district judge, I presided over

the civil trial of Case No. 940900191 on November 14 and 15,
1994,

wherein Sheree Hewett as plaintiff sued D&S Corp. , dba

Intermountain Printing/Type Tech seeking damages for unpaid rent
for the lease of a commercial building located at 3772
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah.
3.

Throughout the trial of this matter, plaintiff

Sheree Hewett was represented by Timothy W. Blackburn and
defendant Intermountain Printing was represented by Robert A.
Echard.
250X10381 1
08/10/95

4.

On November 14, Mr, Echard, after examining

defendant' s witnesses and prior to resting defendant' s case,
requested that the court personally observe the.building at 3772

A
Washington Boulevard.
5.

After I adjourned court on November 14, 1994, I

proceeded to 3772 Washington Boulevard and personally viewed the

ert&rior fy+fa
building at issue.
A

ii
DATED this

1[

day of August, 1995.
MICHAEL D. LYON

\

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this
August, 1995,

ik

n

'Wr^u
NOTARY S i g n a t u r e and S e a l
DEAN C. OLSfc:

NOTARY PU8UC*STAnotU'
847 EAST 2800 NORTH
NORTH OGDEN, UT 84414

COMM. EXP. 2-24-97
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day of

